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The International Dollar Standard
and the Sustainability of the 
U.S. Current Account Deﬁcit
FOR MORE THAN twenty years the world’s richest, most mature industrial
economy has drawn heavily on the world’s limited pool of saving to sup-
port high consumption—in the 1980s by the federal government, and in
the 1990s by households. Over the past decade, personal saving has fallen
more than government saving (as manifested in the recent budget sur-
pluses) has increased. The huge deficit in the current account of the U.S.
balance of payments, equivalent to about 4.4 percent of gross national
product (GNP) in 2000, reﬂects this saving gap. In order to support a nor-
mal level of gross domestic investment (historically about 16 to 17 percent
of GNP) as well as this increased consumption, America has had to draw
heavily on the saving of the rest of the world. On a ﬂow basis, the United
States now attracts more capital, net, than all developing countries
combined. 
The international balance sheet of the United States has declined in cor-
responding fashion. From being a net creditor to the rest of the world at the
beginning of the 1980s, the United States transformed itself into the
world’s largest net debtor—to the tune of an incredible $2 trillion or
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ican firms and American households. The indebtedness of the personal
sector is now a record 1.03 times disposable income; ﬁrms in the aggregate
also show a very high indebtedness relative to cash ﬂow. 
Should Americans worry about this anomalous situation? After all, the
dollar remains strong, and the United States is unique in having a virtu-
ally unlimited line of credit with the rest of the world, which is largely
denominated in its own currency. American banks and other ﬁnancial insti-
tutions are relatively immune to currency risk because both their assets,
which are largely claims on the domestic economy, and their (deposit)
liabilities, of which a substantial fraction is owed to foreigners, are denom-
inated in dollars. 
Other debtor countries must learn to live with currency mismatches
when their banking and other corporate international liabilities are dollar
denominated but their assets are denominated in the domestic currency.
Indeed, this kind of mismatch was the genesis of the great Asian currency
crisis of 1997–98. Because Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Thailand had large outstanding, short-term dollar liabilities, they
became extremely vulnerable to a currency attack, and the resulting deval-
uations bankrupted their domestic financial institutions. In contrast, no
matter how precarious and overleveraged the financing of American bor-
rowers—including American banks, which intermediate such borrowing
internationally—might be, they are invulnerable to dollar devaluation. 
Does this invulnerability to currency crises simply reflect the greater
strength of the American capital markets and the greater wisdom of Amer-
ican regulatory authorities, compared with other industrial countries? No.
The fact that the United States is the preferred and highly favored inter-
national borrower is pure serendipity. How did this accident of history
come about?
The International Dollar Standard
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, confidence in the curren-
cies and ﬁnancial systems of all the other industrial countries in the world
had evaporated. To prevent capital flight mainly to the United States, the
European countries as well as Japan imposed tight exchange controls.
The relatively stable U.S. dollar was the only major currency in which
228 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
0099—06 BPEA /McKinnon  7/3/01  12:14  Page 228international exchange could freely take place. In the late 1940s, under the
Bretton Woods monetary order, other nations declared official exchange
rate parities against the dollar, making it the central numéraire for the
system. This official monetary order did not create asymmetry among
currencies; it simply recognized it.1 Thus was the dollar enthroned as
“international money.”
When this system of ofﬁcial exchange rate parities broke down in 1971,
the dollar was not dethroned. To the present day, the dollar is still the
main vehicle currency in the interbank spot and forward exchange mar-
kets, the currency of invoice for primary commodity trade and for many
industrial goods and services, and the main currency of denomination for
international capital flows—particularly short-term and interbank flows.
Outside of Europe, governments use the dollar as their prime intervention
currency, often unofﬁcially pegging to the dollar, and U.S. Treasury secu-
rities are widely held by foreign central banks and treasuries as official
exchange reserves.
This status of the dollar as international money, providing the central
currency in the world system, is a natural monopoly. Consider ﬁrst a world
of n national currencies in which there is no ofﬁcial intervention or foreign
exchange targeting by governments. In organizing private interbank mar-
kets for foreign exchange, great savings in transactions costs can be had
if just one national currency, the nth, is chosen as the vehicle currency.
Then all foreign exchange quotations—bids and offers—at all terms to
maturity can take place against this one vehicle currency. The number of
active markets can be reduced from n(n – 1)/2 to just n – 1. In a world of
more than 150 national currencies, this represents a tremendous economy
of markets for the large commercial banks that make the foreign exchange
market. The dollar’s interbank predominance (it is on one side or the other
of almost 90 percent of interbank transactions) allows banks to cover both
their forward exchange and their options exposures much more efﬁciently. 
Trade in goods and services shows a similar pattern in which one
national money is used as the main currency of invoice. Exports of homo-
geneous primary products such as oil, wheat, and copper all tend to be
invoiced in dollars, with worldwide price formation in a centralized
exchange. Spot trading, but especially forward contracting, is concentrated
at these centralized exchanges—which are usually in American cities such
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exchanges do exist in London and elsewhere. 
Except for those from the large European countries, exports of hetero-
geneous services and manufactured goods also tend to be invoiced in
dollars—even exports from Japan. In intraregional trade in Asia and Latin
America, the dollar is overwhelmingly used for invoicing of both primary
commodities and manufactures. And all countries trading directly with the
United States itself see both imports and exports invoiced in dollars. 
Having once been settled on for whatever historical reason, the dollar
offers huge economies of scale for its continued use as the central vehicle
in international exchange. (The major exception is the strong regional
role played by the euro for countries on the fringe of the European Union.)
Among the other 150 or so countries in the world system, the more that
countries A and B use the dollar in international exchange, the more attrac-
tive (that is, cost reducing) it becomes for countries C and D to do so. In
effect, the dollar could now only be deposed by some cataclysmic event,
such as massive inﬂation in the United States.
The Nominal Anchor
In periods of reasonable confidence in American monetary policy, like
that we have witnessed over the past decade and, before that, in the 1950s
and 1960s, these dollar prices of goods and services are relatively invari-
ant to fluctuations in the dollar’s exchange rate. In contrast, any other
country that allows its exchange rate to fluctuate against the dollar will
experience a higher rate of pass-through of those fluctuations into its
domestic goods prices; if its currency weakens against the dollar, it will
also experience problems with servicing its short-term dollar liabilities to
foreigners. (Again, Europe is a partial exception.) The upshot is what
Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart call “fear of ﬂoating”: most coun-
tries are reluctant to let their exchange rates ﬂoat freely against the dollar.2
What are the monetary implications of not floating? To an important
degree, other countries subordinate their domestic monetary policies to the
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ations in their dollar exchange rates. Of course, high-inflation countries
must let their currencies fall against the dollar over the long term, but in
noncrisis periods even they strive to stabilize their exchange rates from one
day (or one week) to the next.3
Consequently, possessing the nth currency in an n-currency world, only
the United States has the freedom to conduct its own monetary policy
independently (except in great crises) of exchange rate fluctuations—
creating for other countries what Robert Mundell called the “redundancy
problem.”4 Essentially ignoring the dollar’s exchange rate against other
currencies, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan can focus on sta-
bilizing the American price level and the purchasing power of the dollar
in terms of real goods and services, and at this he has been quite success-
ful. Then the American price level becomes the (informal) nominal anchor
for the international monetary system.
When the dollar-based nominal anchor seems secure as it does now,
unlike in the 1970s when inflation was high and variable, this reinforces
the willingness of other countries to target their dollar exchange rates
(again putting aside the euro zone as a quasi-independent monetary
regime). They become very reluctant to see their currencies depreciate
against the dollar because of the longer-term inﬂationary threat. And they
may be even more reluctant to see any substantial appreciation of their cur-
rencies against the dollar, for fear of losing mercantile competitiveness in
world markets in the short or the medium term. In particular, countries
are most unlikely to jettison, or even to stop accumulating, their huge
official exchange reserves—which are mainly dollar denominated and
often consist of U.S. Treasury securities. Such a selloff would provoke a sharp
appreciation of their currencies against the dollar. Willy-nilly, foreign gov-
ernments cannot avoid being important creditors of the United States.
America’s Soft Borrowing Constraint
Although this central monetary role for the dollar is all well and good
for promoting more efficient international exchange, an incidental conse-
quence is that the United States itself faces a much softer constraint on its
Ronald I. McKinnon 231
3. McKinnon (2001).
4. Mundell (1968).
0099—06 BPEA /McKinnon  7/3/01  12:14  Page 231own international borrowing. As the rest of the world’s income grows,
the demand by foreign enterprises and governments to build up their
stocks of international liquidity rises commensurately. America can pro-
vide these liquid dollar assets—whether paper currency, claims on Amer-
ican banks, U.S. Treasury or government agency bonds, or (although these
are somewhat less liquid) various private bonds or stocks—all of which are
claims on American ﬁrms and households with no well-deﬁned time frame
for net repayment for the country as a whole. 
The closest analogy to the United States’position is that of a central
bank issuing fiat money within its own national monetary domain.
Although banknotes and coins may formally be liabilities of the central
bank, in practice they never have to be redeemed, because the private sec-
tor’s demand for domestic money is ongoing. Analogously, on an interna-
tional scale, the collectivity that is the United States can issue to the rest of
the world liquid claims on itself that “never” have to be redeemed.
For the last twenty years, the United States has chosen to exploit this
soft borrowing constraint by absorbing capital on a net basis from the rest
of the world. But this need not be the case. An efficient dollar standard
does not depend on America’s running current account deﬁcits to provide
international liquidity. Even without such deficits, the rest of the world
could still have built up the dollar liquidity it so craves.
In fact, in the 1950s and 1960s the United States ran large current
account surpluses. However, its long-term capital outflows—including
illiquid direct investment abroad as well as development aid—exceeded
these current surpluses. This payments gap was then covered by more liq-
uid and generally shorter-term capital inﬂows: foreign ﬁrms built up their
liquid stocks of U.S. bank deposits and money market instruments, and
foreign governments built up stocks of U.S. Treasury securities. Like a
giant international financial intermediary, the United States lent long to,
and borrowed (less) short term from, the rest of the world.5 Through these
gross capital flows, the United States satisfied the world’s growing
demands for dollar liquidity while remaining a net creditor. 
If, in the new millennium, the United States manages to return to cur-
rent account balance or even begins to run surpluses, the rest of the world
could still quite comfortably get the liquidity it seeks through greater long-
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forth here that the U.S. line of credit with the rest of the world is indefi-
nitely long, why not just keep borrowing to cover current account deﬁcits?
Are American consumers not better off if they can continue to keep their
expenditures above their incomes by continuing to borrow? 
Financial Fragility
There are two big problems with continuing the status quo of running
large current account deficits. The first is that it leads to excessive bor-
rowing and declining creditworthiness on the part of individual American
households and some firms. The second is an increasing threat of protec-
tionism as the large trade deficit continues to erode America’s industrial
base.
The first problem, the overleveraging of American households and
ﬁrms, is aggravated by the ability of banks and consumer credit companies
to ﬁnance themselves too cheaply on international markets. Either directly
or indirectly, these institutions can easily sell liquid dollar deposits and
other ﬁnancial instruments to foreigners to ﬁnance the proliferation of con-
sumer credit and mortgage lending in the United States. The resulting
incredibly low net worth of American households with moderate incomes
makes the macroeconomy more vulnerable. For example, the large house-
hold debt overhang could well aggravate the cyclical downturn in 2001
by inducing a sharp rise in household bankruptcies—and a sharp decline in
consumer spending more generally. 
To a degree, the American corporate sector is less vulnerable to over-
leveraging from the economy’s soft borrowing constraint in international
markets. Foreigners can and do buy not just debt but also equity claims
on American corporations—they acquire U.S. stocks as well as corporate
bonds and commercial paper. Thus the debt-to-equity ratios of most Amer-
ican companies, although still uncomfortably high, need not continue to
rise as more foreign capital flows in. To the extent that overleveraging by
companies is a problem, it is more one of U.S. tax law and corporate
governance.
No one, however, including foreigners, can buy equity claims on Amer-
ican households. Thus, insofar as the influx of foreign capital softens
household budget constraints, the result is a greater buildup of household
Ronald I. McKinnon 233
0099—06 BPEA /McKinnon  7/3/01  12:14  Page 233indebtedness. American banks as (international) financial intermediaries
are “special” in two important senses. First, they lend to domestic eco-
nomic units—American households and small ﬁrms—that cannot ﬁnance
themselves through the direct issue of stocks or bonds in primary securi-
ties markets. Second, foreign claims on American banks are an important
component of international liquidity for which the rest of the world’s
demand is rather strong. Although heavily indebted American households
may not seem to be borrowing from foreigners, they are indeed doing so
indirectly through the intermediation of domestic banks and finance
companies.
The Dutch Disease and Protectionism
The second problem stems from a political-economic restraint on
American trade deﬁcits, namely, the transfer problem. Foreign saving can
only be transferred to the United States through large U.S. current account
deficits, that is, by allowing American expenditure to rise above Ameri-
can income. For any given level of income, this means a reduction in
American exports (broadly defined) and an increase in imports. And
because of peculiarly heavy state intervention and protectionism for agri-
culture and some services around the world, it is the industrial sector that
typically bears the brunt of adjustment to such a swing in the trade
balance. 
To accommodate the trade deficit, other things remaining equal, Amer-
ican manufacturing industries must contract, on both the export side and
the import-competing side. Boeing will have a much tougher time com-
peting against Airbus in aircraft, Xerox against Ricoh in copiers, Ford
against Toyota in automobiles, Caterpillar against Komatsu in heavy
equipment, and so on. Indeed, America is largely exiting, or has exited,
certain industries—such as photographic equipment that includes the
latest digital technologies—altogether. Even where the United States has
a technological lead, as it does, for example, in computers, integrated
circuits, and Internet-related equipment, the rate at which American firms
farm out their production to overseas affiliates will be greater because of
the need to transfer net capital from the rest of the world.
A purist might say, “If this is what the market dictates, then so be it.”
But in some sense “the market” is biased by international monetary con-
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credit line with the rest of the world. If American consumers exploit this
credit line—or the issuers of credit cards cajole them into doing so—the
resulting capital inﬂows and strong dollar will lead to a trade deﬁcit. This
international monetary version of the Dutch disease has led to an unusual
shrinkage in America’s industrial base, which continues today. 
More important, the political obstacles to preserving free trade are
increased when the trade deficit is large. A declining American export sec-
tor reduces the supply of lobbyists in favor of keeping foreign markets
open reciprocally with the domestic market. A second political obstacle
is the perception, correct or not, that a large trade deficit reflects “unfair”
trading practices by foreigners, and that the government should do some-
thing offsetting to protect American industry. 
During the recent “Goldilocks” period of the American economy, from
1995 through 2000, an unusually low rate of unemployment and an unusu-
ally rapid rate of growth dampened these underlying protectionist pres-
sures. However, once the economy slips into a cyclical downturn, with
rising unemployment and widespread industrial bankruptcies, protection-
ist pressure will reappear with a vengeance. The recurrent bouts of Japan-
bashing before 1995 could well be superseded by episodes of China-bashing
in 2001 and beyond. In the longer run, the political economy of preserving
free trade on a world scale would be much easier to sustain if the center
country’s trade accounts came into better balance. 
Tax Cuts the United States Can Afford
There is another danger. In 2000, through the large budget surplus, the
federal government contributed to national saving (to the tune of over 
2 percent of GNP), thus partly offsetting the private dissaving that gener-
ated the trade deficit. If the surplus is reduced by the massive tax cuts
passed by the Congress in May 2001, without in the process generating a
substantial increase in U.S. personal saving, America’s huge current
account deﬁcit will surely increase still further.
Beyond credit cards, an important aspect of the problem of low personal
saving is that Americans are putting aside far too little in their pension
plans and then taking out too much. Both behaviors are tax driven. Thus
any tax “cuts” should take the form of much higher ceilings on personal
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mulate funds within their pension plans indefinitely without facing tax
penalties.
Eliminating, or at least substantially recrafting, the federal estate and
inheritance taxes could further increase the incentives for American house-
holds to save in order to pass more wealth on to the next generation—
both inside and outside their pension plans. New retirees would no longer
be so eager to convert the capital in their pension funds into annuities and
thus consume it all over their own lifetime. They would be more content to
leave some portion of their pension accumulations as a lump sum if they
knew it would not be subject to the estate tax. In any case, putting all of
one’s retirement capital into a fixed annuity is risky: there is no margin
for error should one be hit with some unexpected expense. 
These are but two examples of how tax cuts might increase American
households’propensity to save. A proper menu of tax and other institu-
tional reforms would go well beyond what can be covered here. The bot-
tom line is that, if one takes the balance of international payments into
account, tax reforms that demonstrably increase private saving should be
at the forefront of what the new administration is considering. But this is
a lot to consider and perhaps too much to hope for.
Is the Dollar Standard’s Survival at Stake?
Like most writers on the subject, Catherine Mann, in an extraordinar-
ily comprehensive statistical analysis in her book, Is the U.S. Trade Deﬁcit
Sustainable? treats the United States as just another important large coun-
try.6 It has some special economic features, to be sure, but nevertheless it
is similar to other countries with large debts in that it must ultimately pay
back what it has borrowed. She concludes:
All told, this calculation for the investor constraint alongside the borrower con-
straint supports the notion that the US current account is sustainable for at least
two or three more years, or even longer as judged by the investors’constraint.7
From her analysis, if the American current account deficit remains high,
then capital flight from the dollar, higher U.S. interest rates, and a weak
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dollar, besides forcing a correction in the American current account deﬁcit,
would also undermine the international dollar standard. 
My own view is that the only real threat to the dollar-based institutions
of international exchange could come from chronic inﬂation in the United
States itself. Absent monetary instability in the center country, the dollar
standard is robust and could continue without the United States running up
against significant borrowing constraints from the rest of the world. Any
incipient run on the dollar would be offset by foreign central banks accu-
mulating dollar reserves in order to prevent their currencies from appreci-
ating, because to do otherwise would impose a loss on their countries’
international mercantile competitiveness. However, for reasons adum-
brated above, the world and the U.S. economies would be better off if the
American current account deﬁcit were smaller or nonexistent. 
Most people would suppose that America’s ability to attract vast
amounts of capital from the rest of the world in the 1990s hinged on the
extraordinary boom in the “Goldilocks” economy of those years, which
made the United States a great place in which to invest. Indeed, Mann wor-
ries that if growth in the United States should slow down and growth pick
up in the rest of the world, a sharp reversal of net capital flows could
occur—possibly leading to substantial dollar depreciation.8
However, faster growth in the rest of the world would also increase the
demand for international liquidity. Foreign firms and financial institu-
tions—including central banks—would become even more willing to
accumulate dollar bank balances, Treasuries, and so on. Provision of this
liquidity would amount to a countervailing capital ﬂow back to the United
States. Thus, from the perspective of the monetary economics of the world
dollar standard put forth here, the dollar—and its special place in the world
economy—need not be vulnerable to the kind of relative slowdown in the
U.S. economy that Mann and others fear. 
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Disappearing U.S. Treasury Securities—Should We Worry? 
IN HIS REMARKS of last January 25 advocating cuts in tax revenue in 2001,
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan deemphasized the usual Keynesian
argument for a countercyclical economic stimulus. Taking a longer per-
spective, Greenspan worried instead that large fiscal surpluses—on pro-
jections that assume no tax cut—would eliminate the stock of Treasury
bonds held outside the Social Security system. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget estimated in June 2000 that debt held by the public (that
is, excluding that held in U.S. government accounts but including that held
by the Fed) would be fully redeemed by 2012. Already signs abound that
the open market for Treasuries is becoming less complete intertempo-
rally, and thus less liquid, with the discontinuance of new issues of one-
year bills and possibly of thirty-year bonds as well.
If the fiscal surpluses continued after all Treasury securities had been
retired, the American government, including the Fed, would have no
choice but to start acquiring claims on the private sector with its surplus
tax revenue. Greenspan sees the government granting credit to, or acquir-
ing ownership claims on, private agents as far too intrusive. However, if
tax cuts were geared mainly to inducing more private saving through, say,
individual 401(k) plans, the net worth of American households would
likely improve. The macroeconomic fragility induced by overleveraging
would be reduced. And in principle, households could demand more Trea-
suries with their increased saving. However, demand for a safe and “neu-
tral” liquid asset from important financial institutions—the Fed itself,
commercial banks, insurance companies, and their foreign counterparts,
including other central banks—would almost surely dominate bidding for
the extant stock of Treasuries (much as it does now). With saving-inducing
tax cuts, therefore, the Greenspan “problem” of overly intrusive govern-
ment in the private financial markets would be solved without increasing
the current account deﬁcit. 
In contrast, if the tax cuts went beyond providing incentives to increase
private saving by Americans, the supply of Treasuries to world markets
would certainly increase. However, the cost would now be an increase in
the current account deﬁcit without any reduction in the precarious ﬁnancial
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held by foreigners would surely rise.
In the absence of any U.S. tax cuts (or expenditure increases), can the
world dollar standard survive the elimination of Treasuries from interna-
tional markets? In 2000, foreigners held about 42 percent of Treasury
securities not held by U.S. government trust funds or by the Fed, and about
half of these foreign holdings were by official institutions such as central
banks or treasuries. Ofﬁcial foreign exchange reserves can be huge: Japan
holds the equivalent of more than $350 billion, China $150 billion, Hong
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan $100 billion each, and so on for lesser amounts
across almost every country in the world. Most of these exchange reserves
are in dollar assets, with a high proportion in Treasuries. 
Free of default risk, Treasuries are seen as the risk-free asset in the
world’s capital markets. Because the U.S. federal government owns the
dollar-creating central bank (the Fed), it can always create the means of
settlement on its own debt—whether held domestically or by foreigners.
Under the world dollar standard, no other country can similarly create
international money at will.
Undoubtedly, the attractiveness of Treasuries as an international asset
has contributed to the very elastic line of credit with the rest of the world
that the United States has exploited for the past twenty years. But having
such a safe reserve asset, with assured international purchasing power, is
also a great convenience to other countries in the world system. With the
dollar so commonly in use as a vehicle and invoice currency, finding an
equally liquid replacement to use as an international reserve asset would
be difﬁcult. 
But not impossible. In the absence of Treasury securities, foreign cen-
tral banks and finance ministries could experiment with holding dollar
assets such as bonds or stocks that are claims on the American private
sector—or on foreign issuers of dollar-denominated debt, although this
would be inherently more risky. In any event, credit risk in official reserve
holding would be more of a problem. And then Greenspan’s dilemma
would arise in an additional guise: foreign governments, as well as the
U.S. government, would intrude on the financing of private American
companies! 
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